Economics

April 24, 2023

Debt Ceiling Update: X Marks the Spot

Special Commentary

Economist(s)

Summary

  • In mid-January, we published a report on the outlook for the U.S. federal government's borrowing limit, also known as the debt ceiling. Since then, the U.S. economy has evolved tumultuously. However, one thing that has not changed over the past few months is policymakers inability to come to an agreement to increase or suspend the debt ceiling. Our sense is that Congress and the president are no closer to a debt ceiling resolution than they were when we published our last report on January 19.

  • In the meantime, the U.S. Treasury has leaned on incoming tax revenues, cash on hand and "extraordinary measures" to remain current on all its obligations despite the binding borrowing limit.

  • The month of April is typically the largest month of the year for federal tax collections because of the annual filing deadline for individual income taxes. As a result, the incoming data on April tax receipts are critical to the outlook for the debt ceiling "X date", or the date on which the Treasury would be unable to meet all of its obligations on time due to the debt limit.

  • Tax revenues in 2022 were unusually strong, and some payback this year was inevitable. However, April tax collections thus far have been slightly weaker than we anticipated.

  • Our base case projection for the X date has been early- to mid-August since we laid out our initial forecast in January. In our view, an X date in early August is still the most probable outcome. More specifically, the first three days of August seem most likely to contain the X date.

  • However, we believe there is a small tail risk that the Treasury could hit the X date in the first half of June. In our view, this presents a difficult risk management question of how high the probability of default in early June needs to be such that Treasury weighs in with guidance that the debt ceiling must be resolved in the next six weeks.

  • A low but not insignificant probability of a U.S. default is still very concerning, and we would think the last thing Treasury officials want is an X date that sneaks up on Congress. If Treasury gives explicit X date guidance in the coming weeks, we would expect markets to gravitate towards this as the "official" X date.

  • Ultimately, our economic forecast is predicated on the assumption that the debt ceiling is eventually increased or suspended with little to no collateral damage on the real economy. However, past brushes with default have tightened financial conditions, occasionally in a significant way, such as the summer of 2011.

  • We covered whether Treasury could adopt a prioritization plan in our January report on the debt ceiling, and we would direct interested readers to that piece for further reading. But as a reminder, even if a payment prioritization plan is implemented by the Treasury Department, such a plan would be entirely experimental and would still come with a litany of legal, technical, economic and political challenges. The economic impact of a default is highly uncertain since that has never happened previously, but economic modeling suggests the fallout could be quite severe.

X Date: Base Case Still Early August

In mid-January, we published a report on the outlook for the U.S. federal government's borrowing limit, also known as the debt ceiling. Since then, the U.S. economy has evolved tumultuously. Employment has continued to grow at a robust rate despite challenges in certain sectors, inflation has remained uncomfortably high and two high-profile bank failures have caused turbulence in the financial system. However, one thing that has not changed over the past few months is policymakers inability to come to an agreement to increase or suspend the debt ceiling. Our sense is that Congress and the president are no closer to a debt ceiling resolution than they were when we published our last report on January 19. House Republicans may pass their own debt ceiling bill this week, but the plan contains numerous policy changes that Democratic leaders consider nonstarters, such as repealing various clean energy tax credits, blocking student loan forgiveness and steep cuts to discretionary spending over the next decade.1

Our sense is that Congress and the president are no closer to a debt ceiling resolution than they were when we published our last report on January 19.

In the meantime, the U.S. Treasury has leaned on incoming tax revenues, cash on hand and "extraordinary measures" to remain current on all its obligations despite the binding borrowing limit (Figure 1). However, these sources of funds are slowly running dry. As of March 31, the U.S. Treasury had just $39 billion of extraordinary measure wiggle room at its disposal. Another one-time extraordinary measure that frees up approximately $133 billion of headroom under the debt limit becomes available on June 30, but for now that tool remains unavailable.2 Until then, Treasury must rely on the tax receipts its receives to meet all of its obligations. Fortunately, the month of April is typically the largest month of the year for federal tax collections because of the annual filing deadline for individual income taxes (Figure 2).

Figure 1
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury and Wells Fargo Economics
Figure 2
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury and Wells Fargo Economics

Tax revenues in 2022 were unusually strong, and some payback this year was inevitable. However, April tax collections thus far have been slightly weaker than we anticipated. Non-withheld individual income taxes paid to the Treasury are running closer to 2019 levels than 2022 levels (Figure 3). This boost in tax receipts has pushed the U.S. Treasury's cash balance (also known as the Treasury General Account, which is held at the Federal Reserve) up to $280 billion from its recent low (Figure 4). This cash build-up should permit Treasury to remain solvent for a little while longer. But because the federal government runs an annual budget deficit, sooner or later additional borrowing will be needed. Thus, the “X date”, or the date on which the Treasury would be unable to meet all of its obligations on time, lies at some point in the near future. But when?

April tax collections thus far have been slightly weaker than we anticipated.

Figure 3
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury and Wells Fargo Economics
Figure 4
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury and Wells Fargo Economics

In mid-January, we wrote that early- to mid-August was our preliminary modal forecast for where the X date would ultimately land if negotiations go down to the wire. In our view, an X date in early August is still the most probable outcome. More specifically, the first three days of August seem most likely to contain the X date. Monthly Medicare Advantage and Part D payments are due on August 1, as is a large share of pay for active-duty members of the military, civil service and military retirees, veterans and recipients of Supplementary Security Income. Combined, these expenditures total roughly $65 billion and make August 1 a prime day of concern. Two days later on August 3 about $25 billion of Social Security benefits will be disbursed (Figure 5).

In our view, an X date in early August is still the most probable outcome.

Figure 5

However, there is a small tail risk that the Treasury could hit the X date in the first half of June. As we discussed in our preview piece, it is important to keep in mind that revenues and outlays are not evenly distributed across months or even within months. If Treasury can stretch its funds through to June 15, a quarterly deadline for corporate tax payments should bring another revenue infusion of $75 billion or so. That should be enough money to remain solvent for at least another couple of weeks, at which point the aforementioned $133 billion one-time extraordinary measure becomes available on June 30. Our federal budget deficit forecast for July happens to be in the ballpark of $130 billion, and from there it becomes more clear how our base case X date forecast lands in early August. The federal government generally runs one of its largest monthly budget deficits of the year in August, so getting to the next corporate tax payment deadline on September 15 is quite unlikely in our view (Figure 6).

There is a small tail risk that the Treasury could hit the X date in the first half of June.

However, the above analysis is contingent on getting to June 15, and the math is tight enough that Treasury could be cutting it pretty close on the eve of the quarterly corporate tax payments. In our view, this presents a difficult risk management question of how high the probability of default in early June needs to be such that Treasury weighs in with guidance that the debt ceiling must be resolved in the next six weeks. A low but not insignificant probability of a U.S. default is still very concerning and might warrant a warning from Treasury Secretary Yellen or other top Treasury officials. We would think the last thing Treasury officials want is an X date that sneaks up on Congress somewhat unexpectedly. Yields on Treasury bills appear to reflect this uncertainty. The four-week T-bill yield auctioned on April 20, which matures before June, came in at a remarkably low 3.25%. In contrast, the eight-week T-bill auctioned on the same day registered a much higher yield of 4.97%. Thus far, equity markets have been relatively calm as the debt ceiling X date barrels closer (Figure 7), and credit spreads on corporate bonds also have remained relatively in check. If Treasury gives explicit X date guidance in the coming weeks, we would expect markets to gravitate towards this as the "official" X date.

Figure 6
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury and Wells Fargo Economics
Figure 7
Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P. and Wells Fargo Economics

Ultimately, our economic forecast is predicated on the assumption that the debt ceiling is eventually increased or suspended with little to no collateral damage on the real economy. However, past brushes with default have tightened financial conditions, occasionally in a significant way, such as the summer of 2011. We covered whether Treasury could adopt a prioritization plan in our January report, and we would direct interested readers to that piece for further reading. But as a reminder, even if a payment prioritization plan is implemented by the Treasury Department, such a plan would be entirely experimental and would still come with a litany of legal, technical, economic and political challenges. The economic impact of a default is highly uncertain since that has never happened previously, but economic modeling suggests the fallout could be quite severe.3 For now, we will continue to monitor developments closely, and we will keep our readers updated on our latest thinking. Stay tuned.

Our economic forecast is predicated on the assumption that the debt ceiling is eventually increased or suspended with little to no collateral damage on the real economy.

Endnotes

1For more information on the House Republican plan, please see this article. (Return)

2As of March 31, the federal retirement thrift savings fund had $22.3B of nonmarketable Treasury securities and the Exchange Stabilization Fund had $16.6B. For further reading on these sources of extraordinary measures, please see this memo from the U.S. Treasury. (Return)

3 Engen, Eric; Follette, Glenn; Laforte, Jean-Philippe. "Possible Macroeconomic Effects of a Temporary Federal Debt Default" Federal Reserve Board. October 4, 2013 (Return)

Subscription Information

To subscribe please visit: www.wellsfargo.com/economicsemail

Via The Bloomberg Professional Services at WFRE

Economics Group

Jay H. Bryson, Ph.D.

Chief Economist

704-410-3274

Jay.Bryson@wellsfargo.com

Sam Bullard

Senior Economist

704-410-3280

Sam.Bullard@wellsfargo.com

Nick Bennenbroek

International Economist

212-214-5636

Nicholas.Bennenbroek@wellsfargo.com

Tim Quinlan

Senior Economist

704-410-3283

Tim.Quinlan@wellsfargo.com

Sarah House

Senior Economist

704-410-3282

Sarah.House@wellsfargo.com

Azhar Iqbal

Econometrician

212-214-2029

Azhar.Iqbal@wellsfargo.com

Charlie Dougherty

Senior Economist

212-214-8984

Charles.Dougherty@wellsfargo.com

Michael Pugliese

Senior Economist

212-214-5058

Michael.D.Pugliese@wellsfargo.com

Brendan McKenna

International Economist

212-214-5637

Brendan.Mckenna@wellsfargo.com

Jackie Benson

Economist

704-410-4468

Jackie.Benson@wellsfargo.com

Shannon Seery

Economist

332-204-0693

Shannon.Seery@wellsfargo.com

Nicole Cervi

Economic Analyst

704-410-3059

Nicole.Cervi@wellsfargo.com

Jessica Guo

Economic Analyst

212-214-1063

Jessica.Guo@wellsfargo.com

Karl Vesely

Economic Analyst

704-410-2911

Karl.Vesely@wellsfargo.com

Patrick Barley

Economic Analyst

704-410-1232

Patrick.Barley@wellsfargo.com

Jeremiah Kohl

Economic Analyst

704-410-1437

Jeremiah.J.Kohl@wellsfargo.com

Coren Burton

Administrative Assistant

704-410-6010

Coren.Burton@wellsfargo.com

All estimates/forecasts are as of 4/24/2023 unless otherwise stated. 4/24/2023 11:20:14 EDT. This report is available on Bloomberg WFRE

Required Disclosures

This report is produced by the Economics Group of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“WFBNA”). This report is not a product of Wells Fargo Global Research and the information contained in this report is not financial research. This report should not be copied, distributed, published or reproduced, in whole or in part. WFBNA distributes this report directly and through affiliates including, but not limited to, Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, Wells Fargo & Company, Wells Fargo Clearing Services, LLC, Wells Fargo Securities International Limited, Wells Fargo Securities Europe S.A., and Wells Fargo Securities Canada, Ltd. Wells Fargo Securities, LLC is registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as a futures commission merchant and is a member in good standing of the National Futures Association. WFBNA is registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as a swap dealer and is a member in good standing of the National Futures Association. Wells Fargo Securities, LLC and WFBNA are generally engaged in the trading of futures and derivative products, any of which may be discussed within this report.

This publication has been prepared for informational purposes only and is not intended as a recommendation offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any security or other financial product nor does it constitute professional advice. The information in this report has been obtained or derived from sources believed by WFBNA to be reliable, but has not been independently verified by WFBNA, may not be current, and WFBNA has no obligation to provide any updates or changes. All price references and market forecasts are as of the date of the report. The views and opinions expressed in this report are not necessarily those of WFBNA and may differ from the views and opinions of other departments or divisions of WFBNA and its affiliates. WFBNA is not providing any financial, economic, legal, accounting, or tax advice or recommendations in this report, neither WFBNA nor any of its affiliates makes any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the statements or any information contained in this report and any liability therefore (including in respect of direct, indirect or consequential loss or damage) is expressly disclaimed. WFBNA is a separate legal entity and distinct from affiliated banks and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Wells Fargo & Company. © 2023 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Important Information for Non-U.S. Recipients
For recipients in the United Kingdom, this report is distributed by Wells Fargo Securities International Limited ("WFSIL"). WFSIL is a U.K. incorporated investment firm authorized and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”). For the purposes of Section 21 of the UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“the Act”), the content of this report has been approved by WFSIL, an authorized person under the Act. WFSIL does not deal with retail clients as defined in the Directive 2014/65/EU (“MiFID2”). The FCA rules made under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 for the protection of retail clients will therefore not apply, nor will the Financial Services Compensation Scheme be available. For recipients in the EFTA, this report is distributed by WFSIL. For recipients in the EU, it is distributed by Wells Fargo Securities Europe S.A. (“WFSE”). WFSE is a French incorporated investment firm authorized and regulated by the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution and the Autorité des marchés financiers. WFSE does not deal with retail clients as defined in the Directive 2014/65/EU (“MiFID2”). This report is not intended for, and should not be relied upon by, retail clients.

SECURITIES: NOT FDIC-INSURED - MAY LOSE VALUE - NO BANK GUARANTEE